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Abstract. In multi-agent systems norms are an important influence
that can engender cooperation by constraining actions and binding groups
together. A key question is how to establish a suitable set of norms in a
decentralised population of self-interested agents, especially where indi-
vidual agents might not adhere to the rules of the system. In this paper we
investigate the problem of norm emergence, and the related issue of group
recognition, using tag-based cooperation as the interaction model. We ex-
plore characteristics that affect the longevity and adoption of norms in
tag-based cooperation, and provide an empirical evaluation of existing
techniques for supporting cooperation in the presence of cheaters.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems often comprise multiple self-interested agents seeking to
achieve tasks that they cannot, or not as easily, achieve alone. In a sense, how-
ever, this self-interest suggests that without some other constraining influence,
cooperation is unlikely to emerge. Norms provide just one source of such influ-
ence on agent behaviour, by constraining actions and binding a group together so
that cooperation naturally arises. In this view, one key question is how to estab-
lish a suitable set of norms. While formally established institutional rules offer
a means of doing this in a centralised fashion, such centralised control is often
not possible in large dynamic environments. Indeed, as has been recognised else-
where [4, 24], social norms are not formal, prescriptive, centrally imposed rules,
but emerge informally through decentralised agent interactions. In this paper,
we explore the nature of such social norms and their impact on group formation
through empirical analysis, and examine the impact of cheating agents: those
that fail to comply with norms but seek to enjoy the benefits of the group.
In seeking to investigate these issues, we adopt the tag-based approach taken
to the problem of group recognition, by Riolo, Cohen and Axelrod, who use ob-
servable tags as markings, traits or social cues attached to individuals [18]. Using
this approach, Hales and Edmonds have achieved promising results in peer-to-
peer settings [12], but these are not resilient when cheaters are introduced, and
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assume that agents have full control over their links to others, and are able to
completely change these links in a single operation. In particular, we need to
support cooperation in dynamic environments in the presence of cheaters where
individuals have limited control over their connections. Here, tags capture social
norms: they are recognised by agents who form groups that share a tag (within
their tolerance values). The tag can be seen as a norm that is adopted by the
agents who share the tag, with the group itself being governed by that norm,
which binds it together. In this paper, we examine the problem of supporting
cooperation from the perspective of norm emergence, and evaluate the effect of
alternative techniques on norm emergence. The key contributions are an eval-
uation of the characteristics affecting the longevity and size of norm-governed
groups in tag-based cooperation, and a further understanding of mechanisms for
coping with cheaters.
The paper begins with an introduction to tag-based cooperation, followed by
the specifics of using context assessment and rewiring to improve group effec-
tiveness in the presence of cheaters. Then, in Section 4, we present an analysis
of our experimental findings, and finally we conclude with a discussion of our
results and their more general significance.
2 Background
It has been widely argued that norms provide a valuable mechanism for reg-
ulating behaviour in decentralised societies [2, 8, 24]. Through the ongoing be-
haviour of individuals, norms can emerge that provide coherence and stability,
and support cooperation. A common view is that where a group of agents share
a particular strategy, behaviour or characteristic, a norm is established [20]. In
this paper we investigate factors influencing norm emergence in a population of
agents, each of which has a set of neighbours with whom it interacts. This ab-
stract environment reflects the form of many real-world settings, such as ad-hoc
communication networks or P2P content sharing. We assume that agents have
limited observations of others and that there is no direct reciprocity, and so we
adopt Riolo, Cohen and Axelrod’s tag-based approach, introduced below.
Tag-based cooperation has been considered for many years by biologists
and social scientists investigating how cooperative societies of selfish individ-
uals might evolve through the recognition of cultural artefacts or traits [1, 5,
7, 13]. Simple observable traits, or tags [14], can be used as cultural artefacts
to engender cooperation without relying reciprocity [3, 18, 23]. Existing work on
tags, however, has given little consideration to the possibility that some mem-
bers of the population may be cheaters who deviate from the rules of the system,
by not cooperating when they should. In this paper, our investigation of norm
emergence allows for the possibility of cheaters.
Riolo, Cohen and Axelrod (RCA) propose a tag-based approach to coop-
eration in which an individual’s decision to cooperate is based on whether an
arbitrary tag (i.e. observable trait) associated with it, is sufficiently similar to
that associated with a potential recipient [18]. The approach is illustrated using
a simple donation scenario in which each agent acts as a potential donor with
a number of randomly selected neighbours. Should an agent opt to donate, it
incurs a cost c, and the recipient gains a benefit b (it is assumed that b > c), oth-
erwise both receive nothing. Each agent i is initially randomly assigned a tag τi
and a tolerance threshold Ti with a uniform distribution from [0, 1]. An agent A
will donate to a potential recipient B if B’s tag is within A’s tolerance threshold
TA, namely |τA − τB | ≤ TA. Agents are selected to act as potential donors in P
interaction pairings, after which the population is reproduced proportionally to
their relative scores, such that more successful agents produce more offspring.
Each offspring is subject to mutation, so that with a small probability a new
(random) tag is received or noise added to the tolerance. In relation to norms,
the key aspect here is that donation rate is an assessment of the effectiveness
of the society and the impact of norms: the greater the effectiveness, the higher
the donation rate.
RCA have shown that a high cooperation rate can be achieved with this
simple approach. They observe cycles in which a cooperative population is es-
tablished, which is then invaded by a mutant whose tag is similar (and so receives
donations) but has a low tolerance (and so does not donate). Such mutants ini-
tially do well, leading to them taking over the population subsequently lowering
the overall rate of cooperation, but eventually the mutant tag and tolerance
become the most common and cooperation again becomes the norm [18].
Hales and Edmonds (HE) apply RCA’s approach in a P2P setting, with two
main changes [12]. First, a learning interpretation of reproduction is adopted, so
that each agent compares itself to another at random and adopts the other’s tag
and tolerance if the other’s score is higher (subject to potential mutations) [18].
Second, HE interpret a tag as being an agent’s neighbours in the P2P network,
i.e. an agent’s links to others. In RCA’s work each agent is connected to each
other agent, with no corresponding notion of neighbourhood. In HE’s model, the
process of an agent adopting another’s tag is equivalent to dropping all of its
own connections, and copying the connections of the other agent (and adding a
connection to the other agent itself) [12]. Importantly, in our view, this model
reflects the formation of groups based on recognition of tags in group members.
Using simulations, HE have shown this approach to be promising in situations
where agents are given free reign to rewire the network and replace all of their
connections each reproduction. This rewiring is an all-or-nothing operation, in
that although an agent can adopt a completely new set of neighbours (replacing
its existing neighbourhood), it cannot modify its existing neighbourhood. Our
view is that such extreme rewiring, where the neighbourhood topology might
completely change with each new generation, is not practicable in all scenarios.
For example, in a communication network this would imply that all existing
routes become outdated and need to be re-established, while in a content sharing
system an agent would lose all information about the content available in its
neighbourhood. In this paper we consider a less extreme situation, in which
agents are able to rewire a proportion of their neighbourhood.
Both RCA and HE assume that agents do not deviate from the rules of
the system, i.e. they assume no cheaters. A cheater is an agent that accepts
donations, but will not donate to others, even if the rules of the system dictate
that it should. We assume that if a cheater reproduces, then its offspring will also
cheat. In this paper we assume that the traits embodied by tags are observable
to others, meaning that cheaters cannot falsify their tags. In standard tag-based
cooperation, introducing even a small proportion of cheaters into the population
causes cooperation to collapse [9].
Norm emergence has been considered in several other settings. For example,
norms can emerge in a social dilemma game when individuals are repeatedly
randomly paired [21], and in certain settings can emerge simply by individuals
learning based on their own individual histories [22]. In this paper, however, our
focus is on using the interpretation of a shared tag as representing a norm to
further our understanding of tag-based cooperation.
3 Improving Group Effectiveness
In seeking to examine the impact of cheaters on group formation and norm
emergence, we consider a population of agents, each of which has its own tag
and a set of connections to n neighbours, such that agents can only interact
with their neighbours (although for reproduction we consider the population
as a whole). We assume that a proportion of agents are cheaters and will not
cooperate with others even when their tags are within the tolerance threshold.
The donation scenario and parameter values used by RCA are adopted, such
that benefit b = 1 and cost c = 0.1 [18]. Each agent i is initially assigned
an arbitrary tag τi and tolerance Ti with uniform distribution from [0, 1]3. We
investigate norm emergence in relation to RCA’s tag-based approach and two
techniques that we have previously proposed for improving cooperation in the
presence of cheaters: context assessment [9] and rewiring [10].
3.1 Context assessment
Our first technique, originally proposed in [9], enables agents to assess their
neighbourhood, or group, in terms of how cooperative they perceive their neigh-
bours to be. The donation decision is modified so that an agent’s assessment of
its neighbourhood context becomes a factor in the decision to donate. Agents
are given a fixed length FIFO memory to record the last l donation behaviours
observed for each neighbour. When the neighbour donates, an observation value
of +1 is recorded, and when it does not −1 is recorded. This memory is fairly
sparse, since the number of interactions is small compared to the number of
agents, and so the overhead incurred is relatively small (2 bits per observation
3 We actually use a lower bound on tolerance of −10−6 to address Roberts and Sher-
ratt’s concerns regarding agents with identical tags being forced to cooperate [19].
This also allows the population to contain non-cooperative agents of the form con-
sidered by Masuda and Ohtsuki [16].
for n× P observations, where n is the number of neighbours and P the number
of pairings).
In order to assess its neighbourhood context, an agent considers each of its n
neighbours in turn, and determines the contribution to the context assessment ci
of neighbour i, which is simply the proportion of observed interactions in which
the neighbour donated, given by:
ci =

∑li
j=1
oji , if o
j
i > 0
0, otherwise
li
, if li > 0
0, otherwise
(1)
where oji represents the j’th observation of neighbour i, and li is the number of
observations recorded of i’s donation behaviour (li < l). By considering each of
its n neighbours, agent A’s assessment of its current neighbourhood context CA
is given by:
CA =
∑n
i=1 ci
n
(2)
This context assessment can be used to influence the donation decision. The
intuition is that agents ‘expect’ that by donating they are more likely to re-
ceive a future donation from some other (observing) agent, thus binding a group
together. However, since the number of interactions is small compared to the
number of agents, this is a weak notion of indirect reciprocity. An agent’s do-
nation to another is unlikely to be directly repaid or directly observed by a
third party, and so there is little direct or indirect reciprocity. Instead, context
assessment gives an impression of the donation behaviour in a neighbourhood,
indicating the likelihood of receiving future donations. An agent’s assessment
of its neighbourhood context is incorporated into the model by adapting the
decision to donate, such that both tolerance and neighbourhood context are
considered. Thus, an agent A will donate to B if:
|τA − τB | ≤ (1− γ).TA + γ.CA (3)
The parameter γ, called the context influence, allows us to tune the technique.
The context influence is in the range [0, 1], with γ = 0 making the technique
identical to RCA’s method, while γ = 1 makes the donation decision determined
solely by an agent’s assessment of its neighbourhood context. We adopt a learning
interpretation of reproduction, such that after a fixed number of interaction
pairings P an agent compares itself to another, randomly selected from the
population. If the other agent is more successful, then its tag and tolerance
are copied (subject to a small probability of mutation), otherwise the tag and
tolerance are unchanged.
3.2 Rewiring
Our second technique, introduced in [10], enables agents to rewire their network
neighbourhoods, such that after reproduction an agent removes a proportion λ,
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Fig. 1. Rewiring showing (a) the original neighbourhood rewired using (b) HE’s
method and (c) our rewiring approach.
called the rewire proportion, of connections, and replaces them with connections
to new neighbours. This approach is motivated by HE’s results, but unlike HE
we do not assume that agents can replace all of their connections since, as
discussed above, this is likely to be impractical in real-world settings. In our
mechanism, after reproduction the n× λ worst neighbours are removed and the
best (non-duplicate) neighbour from each of the agent’s n × λ best neighbours
are added. The neighbours are considered in descending rank order and, for
each, the best non-duplicate neighbour is added. Additional randomly selected
neighbours are added if necessary to prevent the neighbourhood shrinking due
to duplication (agents have at most one connection to another, and duplicate
connections are meaningless). Other rewiring strategies are of course possible,
with alternative criteria for selecting links to remove and add. In [10] we evaluate
a small number of alternatives and show that the strategy described above gives
reasonable performance.
Connections to remove are determined by ranking each neighbour i using the
contribution to the context assessment ci (defined in Equation 1), with agents
having the lowest ci values being removed. The contribution to the context as-
sessment is also used to determine which connections to add, with an agent
asking each of its n× λ best neighbours to recommend their best non-duplicate
neighbour. If the ci values of two or more agents are equal then one is selected
arbitrarily. The rewire proportion determines the extent to which the network
is rewired in each generation. Such rewiring can be thought of as a simplistic
reputation mechanism, since agents update their connections based on the ex-
periences and recommendations of others. However, unlike typical reputation
mechanisms, the assessment is based on relatively little information, which is
not predicated on a notion of (direct or indirect) reciprocity [15, 17].
Figure 1 illustrates the alternative rewiring approaches, in which circles rep-
resent agents, thin solid lines represent existing connections, and dotted and bold
solid lines show dropped and new connections respectively. Agent A’s original
neighbourhood is shown in (a). The results of applying HE’s rewiring approach
is shown in (b) where A drops all of its connections and adopts those of B. Our
rewiring approach is illustrated in (c). If A’s neighbours in order of preference
are B,C,D,E, F , and 2 neighbours are to be replaced, then connections to E
and F will be dropped. If B’s neighbours, are D,H, I,G,A and C’s neighbours
are J,K,L,A, I in preference order, then A will add H from B’s neighbour-
hood (D is already in A’s neighbourhood and so not added) and J from C’s
neighbourhood.
4 Experimental Analysis
Using the PeerSim P2P simulator4, we have built a simulation that allows us to
explore norm emergence using RCA’s standard approach, context assessment,
and rewiring. The quantitative results presented here are averaged over 10 runs
using a population of 100 agents, a neighbourhood size of n = 10, with 10 pair-
ings per agent per generation (P = 10), and a cheater proportion of 30%. Where
context assessment is incorporated a context influence of γ = 0.5 is used, and
similarly where rewiring is incorporated we use a rewire proportion of λ = 0.5.
After reproduction there is a 0.001 probability of mutating the tolerance of each
agent by adding Gaussian noise (with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.01),
along with a probability of mutating each agent’s tag by selecting a new random
value. We consider two configurations for mutating tags: a low mutation rate
of 0.001 and a high mutation rate of 0.01. The low mutation rate represents a
generally stable population in which mutation is simply a small part of the evo-
lutionary process. Conversely, the high mutation rate represents a more dynamic
environment in which there is more significant fluctuation in tags present in the
population (this is akin to a small proportion of the agents leaving and joining
at the end of each generation).
In this section we give an overview of the main findings from our simulations,
focusing on two main characteristics. First, we consider the donation rate defined
as the proportion of interactions resulting in a donation in the final generation of
the simulation, averaged across the population. This indicates the effectiveness
of the groups that emerge in complying with the norms that establish those
groups and govern their maintenance. Second, we consider the number of unique
tags present in the final generation, which indicates the number of norm-governed
groups that have been established. Where a group of agents share a tag (and each
others’ tags are within their tolerance values) we interpret this as recognising
a norm that is then established, since those agents will cooperate by donating
to each other (provided that they are not cheaters). The number of unique tags
indicates the number of such norm-governed groups that are formed, since each
tag value corresponds to a tag group. However, it is important to note that some
tags may be adopted only by a single agent in which case there is no norm, and
so the number of tags is only an indicative metric.
Where there is a low number of unique tags, so that there are few groups, the
average number of agents adopting each tag is high, and the groups are larger
in size, with the respective norms being more widely adopted, and a reduced
likelihood of a tag belonging to a single individual. Conversely, as the number
of unique tags (and therefore groups) increases, the average number of agents
4 http://peersim.sourceforge.net/
(a) low mutation (b) high mutation
Fig. 2. Tags with RCA’s standard approach using low and high mutation rates.
having adopted each tag (and hence in each group) reduces, so that the corre-
sponding norms are less widely adopted and there is an increased likelihood of a
tag being ascribed to a single agent only. Thus, for lower numbers of unique tags
there is more significance in them representing groups of agents having adopted
those tags as norms. Note that this is an informal notion of norm establish-
ment, in comparison to other approaches that have a group leader [6], or explict
strategies emerging rather than simply shared tags [21].
4.1 Context assessment
The base case for our comparisons is RCA’s standard approach, which with a
low mutation rate gives a donation rate of 20.4%, and with a high mutation rate
gives a donation rate of 32.0%. The increased dynamism of the environment,
represented by the increased mutation rate, has a catastrophic effect on the
donation rate, and in turn on group effectiveness. For a donation to occur, agents
must share a tag (within their tolerance values). With a low mutation rate,
RCA’s approach gives an average of 35.8 tags, each shared by 2.8 agents on
average. With a high mutation rate, there are 79.2 tags shared by 1.3 agents on
average. Thus, with a high mutation rate a large number of tags are adopted
by a single agent, as confirmed by the very low donation rate observed (32.0%).
In relation to norm emergence, this means that in the low mutation case the
resulting norms are on average only adopted by 2.8 agents. In the high mutation
case the tag groups do not, on average, correspond to norm emergence since less
than two agents adopt each tag. It is not our concern in this paper to attempt to
define the number of agents needed for norm emergence, but clearly there must
be at least two agents involved.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of tags in the population over the duration of
a sample simulation run for both low and high mutation settings. Each point
represents the presence of a tag in a particular generation, and where a tag
persists for several generations the points form a line from the generation in
which the tag group is created to the generation in which it collapses. Our
(a) low mutation (b) high mutation
Fig. 3. Tags with context assessment using low and high mutation rates.
numerical results are confirmed by Figure 2 which shows that many more tags
are present in the high mutation setting than the low setting. This graphical
representation also allows us to observe the formation of norm-based groups.
In particular, in the low mutation setting norm-governed groups are established
and maintained for many generations, while in the high mutation setting many
such groups have very brief durations appearing as points or very short lines.
(Note that since the number of unique tags is large in Figure 2(b), many of the
points do not represent norm establishment, as discussed above.)
The evolution of tags in the population when using context assessment is
shown in Figure 3. Comparing Figures 2 and 3 it is immediately apparent that
there are significantly fewer tags present using context assessment than with
the standard approach. On average, context assessment in a low mutation set-
ting results in only 3.7 tags (compared to 35.8 with the standard approach)
and 12.1 tags (compared to 79.2) for a high mutation rate. Donation rates of
47.5% and 42.9% are obtained for the low and high mutation settings respec-
tively (compared to 20.4% and 32.0%). The reduction in donation rate in the
high mutation setting compared to the low mutation setting is less pronounced
(approximately 10%) than with the standard approach (where the reduction is
approximately 85%). We see this as demonstration that context assessment is
more stable in supporting cooperation in dynamic environments than RCA’s
standard approach. This tells us that norms resulting from context assessment
are more widely adopted than with RCA’s approach (by 27 and 8.3 agents on av-
erage for the low and high mutation rates respectively). Given that these norms
are more widely adopted, we would expect an increase in the group effectiveness
(as indicated by donation rate achieved), which is indeed the result we observe.
The evolution of the number of unique tags during a sample simulation run for
low and high mutation rates is illustrated in Figure 4. In both settings the num-
ber of tags is initially very high and is (approximately) equal to the population
size since agents are randomly allocated tags. During the first few generations
the number of unique tags drops significantly as agents begin to copy tags from
their more successful neighbours. As the simulation progresses the number of
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Fig. 4. Number of unique tags with context assessment using low and high mutation
rates.
unique tags then stabilises. From Figure 4 we can see that in addition to con-
text assessment resulting in significantly fewer tags than RCA’s approach, the
number of tags also stabilises more quickly. When the mutation rate is high the
number of tags increases, as does the extent of the fluctuations over generations
(with both approaches having similar fluctuation levels). It is clear that norm-
governed groups emerge more quickly using context assessment than with the
standard approach, and on average norms are adopted by many more agents.
Due to space constraints we do not discuss the effect of memory length in this
paper, but in [10] we have shown that it is not a significant factor.
4.2 Rewiring
Rewiring gives similar improvements to context assessment, with donation rates
of 57.0% and 49.8% for the low and high mutation settings respectively (both of
which are higher than with context assessment). The average number of unique
tags is higher than for context assessment, with 11.9 and 16.8 for low and high
mutation rates, but is significantly lower than with RCA’s approach. The norms
that are established are adopted by fewer agents using rewiring than with context
assessment, 8.4 (rather than 27) and 6.0 (rather than 8.3) for the low and high
mutation rates, although by many more agents than with the standard approach.
This result is unexpected, since we intuitively expect that a higher donation rate
(and therefore higher group effectiveness) would be achieved only when norms
are more widely adopted.
The discovery that a higher donation rate can be obtained with smaller
groups is potentially very powerful, since in many situations we would like to
balance the desire to have widely adopted norms (and few groups) with the desire
to ensure that there are several established groups from which agents can select.
The widest possible adoption of a norm is where a single norm is adopted by
the population in a single group. Conversely, the largest set of norms is obtained
where we have a minimum number of agents per tag for norm emergence, giving
(a) low mutation (b) high mutation
Fig. 5. Evolution of tags in a population using rewiring with low and high mutation
rates.
groups of that size. As mentioned above, we are not concerned with attempting
to define a minimum membership, but clearly more than one agent is required,
and so the upper bound of the number of norm-governed groups is half the
population size. In the donation scenario the motivation behind balancing the
level of adoption and number of norms established is that mutations can cause a
norm to collapse at any point, and in such cases we would like agents to be able
to adopt an alternative norm by joining another tag group. However, this balance
is a general issue in many distributed systems, and corresponds to the general
view that fostering competition and avoiding monopolies can be beneficial. The
question of how many norms or groups is ideal in a particular setting is an open
question, and we see this as a key area of future work.
The evolution of tags in the population using rewiring for sample simulation
runs is shown in Figure 5. As is the case with context assessment (Figure 3) there
are significantly fewer tags at any point in time than with RCA’s approach (Fig-
ure 2). As noted above, rewiring results in slightly more tags in any generation
than context assessment. Figure 5 also allows us to observe that the duration of a
given tag group is generally slightly reduced using rewiring in comparison to con-
text assessment, implying that the norms emerging are slightly less long-lived.
In the donation scenario this is not a major concern, since there is little cost to
changing tag groups, but more generally there may be a higher cost associated
with such a change. It is desirable, in general, for norm-governed groups to be
of longer duration as we observe with context assessment, but also for there to
be a reasonable number of alternative groups as with rewiring.
4.3 Combining context assessment with rewiring
We have previously shown that combining context assessment and rewiring im-
proves the donation rate [10], and here we observe donation rates of 68.6% and
63.1% for the low and high mutation settings respectively. In terms of norm emer-
gence, a key question is which, if any, of the properties of context assessment
(a) low mutation (b) high mutation
Fig. 6. Evolution of tags using context assessment and rewiring with low and high
mutation rates.
(few norms of longer duration) and rewiring (more norms of shorter duration)
the combined approach gives. We find that the combined approach results in
4.4 and 10.4 tag groups in the low and high mutation settings, corresponding
to adoption by 22.7 and 9.6 agents on average respectively. In the low mutation
setting this is similar to context assessment, and we would prefer more norms
given our desire to have alternative groups established in case of norm collapse.
With a high mutation rate, the number of norms is similar to that obtained with
rewiring, indicating that there are alternative groups in the event of a norm col-
lapsing. However, the duration of norms and groups is also important in ensuring
that alternatives are available.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of tags using the combination of context assess-
ment and rewiring in sample runs, and we can make two important observations.
First, the run for the low mutation rate represents a particularly low number of
tag groups, with a single dominant group spanning all generations and a small
number of short duration groups appearing. A similar situation can occur when
using context assessment alone (although the run in Figure 3 shows an exam-
ple where this does not occur). We would like to avoid this by ensuring that
there are alternative established norms (i.e. tag groups) at any point in time,
in case of norm collapse. Second, with a high mutation rate many of the groups
established persist for only very short durations. Thus, although there are many
groups, avoiding the problem from the low mutation case, we would like them
to be of longer duration. It seems, therefore, that while combining context as-
sessment with rewiring increases the donation rate, it does not result in groups
that have the desired characteristics. In a low mutation rate we would prefer a
higher number of norm-governed groups to ensure alternative groups are estab-
lished in case of collapse, while with a high mutation rate we would prefer more
persistence to avoid frequent collapses.
Context assessment appears to have a significant reduction on the number
of norm-governed groups established, and so an increase in their size, especially
with a low mutation rate. Although this results in an increased donation rate
Table 1. Summary of donation rate, number of tags and size of tag group (number of
agents per tag) for the low mutation rate.
Average donation Average number Average size
Approach rate of tags of tag group
RCA’s mechanism 20.4% 35.8 2.8
Context assessment 47.5% 3.7 27
Rewiring 57.0% 11.9 8.4
Context assessment and rewiring 68.6% 4.4 22.7
Table 2. Summary of donation rate, number of tags and size of tag group (number of
agents per tag) for the high mutation rate.
Average donation Average number Average size
Approach rate of tags of tag group
RCA’s mechanism 32.0% 79.2 1.3
Context assessment 42.9% 12.1 8.3
Rewiring 49.8% 16.8 6.0
Context assessment and rewiring 63.1% 10.4 9.6
(indeed, when combined with rewiring it gives the highest donation rate) sug-
gesting group effectiveness, it also gives reduced diversity in the population.
In many settings this is undesirable, since if there is collapse of cooperation in
those groups due to the collapse of the respective norms, there are no alternative
established groups for agents to join.
4.4 Summary of results
Our simulations show that both context assessment and rewiring improve group
effectiveness (through donation rate) by the formation of groups of agents sharing
a particular tag value, which we can interpret as norm establishment. A summary
of the quantitative results is shown in Tables 1 and 2. In both the low and high
mutation settings the highest donation rate is achieved when combining context
assessment and rewiring. Rewiring gives the second highest rate, followed by
context assessment, and finally RCA’s approach. In the low mutation setting,
context assessment (with and without rewiring) results in a low number of norm-
governed groups being established. In the high mutation setting the number of
groups established is reduced when context assessment is used in comparison
to rewiring alone, but this difference is less significant. A visual analysis of the
evolution of tags reveals that norm and group duration is potentially an issue,
with each of the techniques discussed resulting in several short duration norm-
governed groups being established.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Interpreting the formation of groups of agents sharing a tag as the emergence
of norms, allows us to view RCA’s approach as facilitating norm emergence.
Indeed, it is norm emergence that leads to donations, since only when two or
more agents share a tag (within their tolerance) will a donation occur. Our
previously proposed techniques of context assessment and rewiring to cope with
cheaters [9, 10] also facilitate norm establishment, and this interpretation enables
us to explore their operation. The norms and groups that are formed are more
widely adopted (with fewer norms) than with RCA’s approach. Using context
assessment increases adoption, especially in the low mutation setting, however
as a result there may not be alternative norm-governed groups available in the
event of the collapse of an established norm.
An increase in mutation rate leads to less long lived and less widely adopted
norms, so that there are more groups, with fewer members, persisting for less
generations. Norms also emerge with many tag groups and few agents per tag,
but only few such norms are widely adopted and long lived, as seen in Figures 3,
5 and 6, where there are few long duration groups. This is a key area of future
investigation, namely to understand the factors that influence the number and
duration of norms, and to investigate whether there is an optimal number of
groups in a given configuration.
Using tag-based cooperation to investigate norm emergence allows us to ob-
serve the effects of various approaches. In particular, it is through norm estab-
lishment (i.e. reducing the number of tags) that context assessment and rewiring
improve group effectiveness, and this interpretation may inform improvements
to tag-based approaches. Since mutation can cause norm collapse it is important
to ensure that there are alternative groups. Context assessment (with or without
rewiring) is found to reduce the diversity of tags to a low level, and this suggests
that further work is needed on coping with cheaters. There is a complex rela-
tionship between the evolution of tag groups, the number of tags, and donation
rate, and we will investigate this in future work. In particular we aim to develop
mechanisms to ensure norm diversity and prolong norm duration. We also aim to
investigate the influence of connection topologies and population size to explore
our techniques in more realistic settings.
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